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The subject of the submitted works and synthesis is the history 
of the adjudication by the central courts of England and Scotland of 
legal claims that local custom, established by community praxis, 
creates legal rights over land that inure to the fluctuating members of 
local communities.  
The thesis of the submitted works, to paraphrase E.P. 
Thompson, is that custom litigation lies at the interface between law 
and community praxis. Customary rights are created ‘in fact’ by the 
praxis of a community, but once contested are recognised as creating 
‘local law’ (England) or ‘legal rights’ (Scotland) by the courts. The 
submitted works explore this interface.  
The synthesis begins with an examination of the literature on 
custom in English and Scots law and explains the development of the 
published works with reference to this literature and their contribution 
to the development of it.  
The synthesis goes on to explain how the English law of 
custom and the Scots law of community servitudes constitute a single 
subject. A doctrinal and functional comparison is made between the 
English law of custom and the Scots law of community servitudes.  
Using evidence drawn from court decisions and the Session Papers, 
the use of the English law of custom in community servitude cases in 
both pleadings by Scots advocates and judicial decisions of the Court 
of Session and the House of Lords is demonstrated.    
The synthesis argues that the reception of custom is an 
iterative process and examines how the method adopted in the three 
works on Scots law reflects this thesis.  The development of legal 
archaeology from method to methodology is explored, as is the 
significance of the method for both the published works and the 
synthesis. Once community praxis reaches the courts, it is mediated by 




lawyers and judges) and extra-legal events.  The synthesis concludes 
that the central argument that underlies both the submitted works, and 
the methodology employed to produce them, is that the reception of 
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This synthesis draws together and presents the candidate’s published 
work in the area of the judicial recognition of community rights in 
Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The submitted 
publications are made up of one article on the English law of custom 
and a chapter and two articles that on the Scots law of community 
servitudes/rights.  Key requirements for a PhD by publication are that 
a clear link can be established amongst the published works such that 
they can be said to constitute a single study and that the works can be 
linked to the method or methodology used to produce them.  
The intellectual links amongst the submitted works are detailed 
in the synthesis below, but it is important to note at the outset that the 
works have not merely been drawn together for the purposes of this 
submission. They were created as part of the candidate’s intellectual, 
jurisdictional and geographical journey.  What follows is a brief 
synopsis of that journey.     
The writing of this synthesis has been to a significant and 
unanticipated extent an exercise in memoir.  This was required by the 
candidate's understanding of the terms governing the production of 
this synthesis.  For example, under the regulations for a PhD by 
publication, this synthesis should ‘[s]tress the coherence of the 
publications, linking them to the methodology adopted’.1 The 
candidate’s method or methodology, on which published articles are 
silent, had to be reconstructed without ‘post hoc’ing’ – that is without 
indulging in the logical fallacy ‘post hoc ergo propter hoc’.2  The 
individual journey that drove the candidate from one separately 
                                                 
1 8A Code of Practice for Research Degrees (Policy, Procedure and Guidelines) 
Academic Year 2017-18 71. 
 
2 The verb form of this phrase is taken from the teaching technique of Cornell’s 





published article to the next and the genesis of the method used is 
therefore usefully detailed to demonstrate the links between them.   
‘The Persistence of the Ancient Regime: Custom, Utility and the 
Common Law in Nineteenth-Century England’ (hereinafter, 
Persistence) was written whilst the candidate was a student serving on 
the editorial board of the Cornell Law Review.3  With the exception of 
a brief foray to the House of Lords Record Office to view materials on 
the Prescription Act, the sources available to the candidate were those 
available in the Cornell Law Library, circa 1992-93.  The article is 
based mainly upon published law reports, taken together with both 
nineteenth and early 20th-century secondary sources, as well as 
contemporary works of jurisprudence, social and legal history.  
Whilst writing Persistence in the United States, the candidate 
came across the Scottish case of Dempster v Cleghorn 1813.4  It was 
indexed under ‘custom' in the volume of House of Lords law reports 
that the candidate was consulting for an English case.   The case, 
which dealt with the right of the community to kill rabbits on St 
Andrew's golf course, struck the candidate as one that might benefit 
from what has become known as ‘doing a Simpson' – that is, an article 
focusing on a single case that analyses its production through a deep 
and thorough review of the factual basis of the case, its historical 
context, and the iterations of the case as it makes its way through the 
legal process.  The case was from the wrong jurisdiction to be 
included in Persistence and so was photocopied and filed away.    
Upon graduation in 1993, the candidate moved from Ithaca, NY 
to Lancaster University in the north of England to take up a 
lectureship.  At the 1994 meeting of the British Legal History 
Conference in Durham, the candidate met Professor John Cairns and 
asked if he knew of any articles about the case of Dempster. He said 
‘no’ but reminded the candidate that Scotland was a mixed jurisdiction 
and that written records of advocate submissions were held by the 
                                                 
3 79 Cornell Law Review 183-218 (1993). 




Advocate’s Library and Signet Library in Edinburgh. 
Professor Christopher Gane, who would go on to be Professor of 
Scots Law and Dean of the Law Faculty of the University of 
Aberdeen, had been Head of the Law Department at Lancaster in the 
1980s, so the library had a substantial Scots law collection.  In those 
days, lecturers were given a small pot of research money to use as 
they liked.  The candidate travelled to Edinburgh to begin her research 
on Dempster v Cleghorn.  The Session Papers, together with records 
held by the National Record Office,5  the record office of St Andrews 
University and the secondary sources available at the University of 
Edinburgh’s law library proved fruitful in terms of detailing the story 
of the Dempster litigation.    
In 1996 the candidate took up a post at Edinburgh University.  In 
the library of Old College, the candidate found that seeking out a 
summary of the law that had been applied in Dempster proved to be 
more challenging than anticipated.  Whilst there was an entry on the 
subject of ‘custom’ in Scots law by David Sellar in the Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia, it was obvious, as detailed below in the section on 
doctrine, that the term ‘custom’ in Scots law was used more narrowly 
than in English law.  The doctrine applied in cases such as Bruce v 
Smith6 was not the same as that applied in Dempster.7   
The three submitted works on the recognition of local customary 
use rights in Scots law had their origin in a search for the law that lay 
behind the story of the St Andrews golf links and the extirpation of its 
rabbits by the inhabitants.  The section on methodology, below, details 
the available sources and how those sources were used in the 
production of the three submitted works on Scots law.   
                                                 
5 The Scottish Record Office changed its name to the National Archives of Scotland 
in early 1999. In 2011, pursuant to the Scotland Public Records Act 2011, it merged 
with the General Register Office for Scotland to become the National Records of 
Scotland (NRS).  
 
6 1890 17 R 1000  
7 David Sellar, ‘Custom as a Source of Law’ 22 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia 





This brief foray into the autobiographical, whilst difficult to 
situate in the body of the synthesis, is nevertheless key to the exercise 
carried out in it.  As recognised by Professor Baker in his chapter 
detailing his method, academic scholarly works are shaped by such 
mundane elements as geography and the availability of research 
funds.8  This is especially true of works produced before the wide 
availability online of both primary and secondary sources. The 
contribution to scholarship of visiting physical archives also cannot be 
underestimated. The scholarly traveller gleans much about a legal 
culture through living and working in it – even if only briefly.  
Working in Scotland, for example, emphasised the small size of the 
legal community there and the significance of the relationships both 
amongst advocates and other members of the community.9 
This brief autobiography also assists with the synthesis as an 
exercise in historiography.  Persistence, for example, reflects the 
contemporary intellectual concerns and trends in the academy in the 
early 1990s and, indeed, earlier – the candidate had been introduced to 
the canon of the English Marxist social historians as part of a history 
degree in the early 1980s.  The submitted works were shaped by what 
was being read by law professors and students at the time they were 
written, for example, the historical studies of Brian Simpson, which 
later would form the basis of the method used in Rabbit Massacre and 
the other works on Scots law.10  
Finally identifying one’s method and methodology after the fact 
fundamentally involves an exercise in academic genealogy.  Beyond 
formal publications, the intellectual backgrounds and interests of 
                                                 
8 Sir John Baker, Reflections on “doing legal history”, in Anthony Musson and 
Chantal Stebbings (eds.) Making Legal History: Approaches 
and Methodologies (Cambridge University Press 2012). 
 
9 See, e.g., Henry Cockburn’s connections to the purser in the Glen Tilt litigation. 
Test Cases 229.  
 
10 Another historiographical footnote to that era is that Simpson’s work appears to 
have been influenced by the work of the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, whose 





professors who advised the candidate both formally and informally 
shaped the submitted works.  As a student, and moreover, a student of 
history, any assessment of the methodology of the submitted works 
requires situating the candidate as part of a particular academic 
tradition that existed at a particular place and time.11   
Such an exercise dates both the candidate and the submitted 
works, but the writing of this synthesis has shown that life experience 
can help to avoid scholarly mistakes. Whilst writing the section on 
Legal Archaeology for this synthesis, it was noted that Peter 
Fitzpatrick had suggested the term to Brian Simpson and that Julie 
Novkov had situated the methodology of legal archaeology in 
Foucault’s scholarship – particularly as interpreted by Peter 
Fitzpatrick and Ben Golder.12  Rather than hypothesise as to what 
Professor Fitzpatrick meant when he advised Brian Simpson what to 
name his method, the candidate wrote to him to ask whether he had 
published anything on the subject or would be willing to be 
interviewed as to why he suggested that Simpson call his method legal 
archaeology.   
Having taught on a faculty peopled by post-modernists at the 
same time as Simpson was publishing Leading Cases, something 
about Fitzpatrick’s advice struck the candidate as a quip reflecting 
contemporary intellectual theories and vocabulary rather than a deeply 
thought out proposal that there was a relationship to be drawn between 
Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge and the methods of Brian 
Simpson.  And so, it proved to be. He replied, 
                                                 
11 As Christopher Hill said in his introduction to The World Turned Upside Down, 
“History has to be rewritten in every generation, because although the past does not 
change, the present does; each generation asks new questions of the past and finds 
new areas of sympathy as it re-lives different aspects of the experiences of its 
predecessors.”  The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English 
Revolution (originally published 1975, Penguin 1991).  
 
12 AWB Simpson Leading Cases in the Common Law (Clarendon Press 1995) 10, 






“Thank you for your intriguing email of the 2nd. I do so wish 
that it were possible for me to engage with your query, but I have 
not the faintest memory as to why I suggested this to Brian. I 
suspect it was a fleeting point made in a conversation about 
many things rather than something long-considered and 
responsible.”13 
 
His reply, as well as the scholarly instinct and ability to directly 
query the source, so as to avoid a post-hoc explanation of the 
development of the methodology of legal archaeology, can be ascribed 
in large part to the historical and legal training and development of the 
critical scholarly sensibilities appropriate to a candidate for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy.  But it also reflects the personal experience 
of the candidate as a scholar and academic.  This is the point of this 
unconventional foray into the autobiographical in the context of a 
synthesis of published works for a PhD by publication.  In order to 
assess the scope, method and methodology of the previously published 
works, historiography, intellectual genealogy, geography and even 
autobiography must be considered in order to trace the development of 
the research questions posed, the methods used to answer them and 
the links amongst the final, resulting works submitted by the candidate 
for the award of a PhD by publication.  
The submitted works, the context of the existing 
literature and their contribution to the 
advancement of the research area  
 
The body of work that is the subject of this synthesis consists of three 
law review articles and one chapter on the subject of the reception of 
local custom by the central courts in Britain in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries as either a source of law (England) or source of 
legal right (Scotland) (hereinafter the ‘submitted works’).  The local 
customs at issue in the submitted works concern community land use 
– that is the legal right of the (fluctuating) inhabitants of a distinct 
                                                 




geographical locale to use land in particular ways as a result of long 
use.  
The legal doctrines under consideration in the submitted 
works and the coherence of the publications submitted 
 
The submitted publications are made up of one article on the English 
law of custom and a chapter and two articles that concern the Scots 
law of community servitudes/rights.  The following section explains 
why these two, distinct doctrines from two distinct jurisdictions 
constitute a single study. Whilst constituting a singular research 
journey, the candidate has never had occasion to compare and contrast 
the English law of custom and the Scots law of community 
servitudes/community rights.  What follows is first, a brief 
explanation of the elements of the relevant doctrines, and secondly, an 
explanation of how the legal history of the two distinct doctrines form 
a single two doctrines form a single study.   
The English Doctrine of Custom  
The legal doctrines under consideration in the submitted works 
concern the reception at law in the central courts in England and 
Scotland of community customs of land use in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.   In England, the legal doctrine under 
consideration is that of ‘custom’.  Custom is the legal doctrine through 
which local use rights over land could be recognised by the central, 
royal courts of both law and equity as having created to lex loci, or 
local common law.   Lex loci varied the common law but was not 
contrary or repugnant to it.  In the context of a dispute over the use of 
land by copyholders or inhabitants where custom was claimed, the 
court would first determine whether a custom existed as a matter of 
fact and then go on to determine whether that custom was good 
custom at law. Where a good custom was found, the royal courts took 
judicial notice of it as lex loci, i.e., the controlling common law of the 




So take for example to the iconic case of Hall v Nottingham, 
which involved a custom of dancing around a Maypole on a village 
green.14  Absent a custom to the contrary, the dancing villagers would 
have been committing trespass by going onto land that they did not 
own to dance.  Once the custom was recognised by the court as lex 
loci, however, had a legal right, under the common law, to go onto the 
land and dance.   
The fact that the court takes judicial notice of the custom 
highlights that custom or lex loci was not created by the common law 
court; it was recognised by it.  The doctrine of judicial notice of 
custom as local common law originates in England’s pluralist legal 
system.   It was the mechanism that the royal courts used to recognise 
and enforce the law of other jurisdictions – whether manor, city or 
county or kingdom. 
The source of lex loci could vary, but the ‘customs’ that are the 
subjected of the submitted works are by the praxis of a community.  
The source of law was the community praxis itself. The court merely 
acted to recognise the custom asserted as lex loci.   Alleged customs 
have to be proved to exist both as a matter of fact and as a matter of 
law. Proof of fact involved evidence of long use. Proof of custom 
could be written, for example in the custumals of a manor, and/ or be 
testified to by older members of the community. 
Once shown to have existed in fact, the alleged custom would 
have to be shown to exist as a matter of law.   To be good custom at 
law, custom must be ancient – that is to have existed beyond the 
memory of man, the legal date of memory being 1189 by analogy to 
the writ of right.  The antiquity of custom, however, was legally 
presumed and could only be rebutted by evidence of contrary use.  By 
the nineteenth century, in the courts under study in Persistence, it was 
widely acknowledged that antiquity was a legal fiction.   Ultimately, 
the Prescription Act (1832) did away with the requirement of proof of 
                                                 




use ‘past the memory of man’ for copyhold customs, although it 
remained in place for the ‘easement-type customs’ that were claimed 
by communities. 
The custom must have been exercised continuously – any 
significant interruption would indicate that the custom was not lex loci 
at all. Continuous community exercise of rights over land both gave 
rise to the custom and was evidence that the community recognised 
the custom and exercised it ‘as of right’.  
The custom must be certain. The court took judicial notice of 
custom as a law that lay without its jurisdiction; therefore, both the 
substantive nature of the custom, as well as the limited area or 
jurisdiction to which the lex loci applied,  must have been certain.  
Finally, custom must be reasonable.  By definition, custom 
varied the common law, but at the same time, it must not have 
conflicted with any fundamental principle of the common law, or, 
indeed, be contrary to positive law. Doctrine states that the test of 
reasonableness was applied to the custom as it was exercised at the 
time and in the context in which it was asserted.  The court was not 
meant to consider the reasonableness of custom’s origins.  This 
allowed the court to refuse to recognise customs that, whilst perhaps 
reasonable in their origins, were no longer so – either in the 
contemporary context or in the manner in which they were being 
exercised.  
In Customs in Common, Thompson traced the influence of the 
decision in Gateward’s Case (1607)15, a unanimous decision of the 
Court of Common Pleas that both established the four modern 
elements of good custom: antiquity, certainty, continuity and 
reasonableness and limited the class of persons who could claim a 
profit à prendre (the right to take something from the soil) by custom.  
Thompson’s central concern was the impact of Gateward’s Case in 
                                                 




the eighteenth century and, in particular, the impact on landless 
cottagers.   
A year after the decision in Gateward’s Case the case of 
Tanistry16 was heard by the Justices of King’s Bench.  Tanistry was a 
case that concerned the reception by the common law of the Irish 
system of inheritance under which the “oldest and most worthy man 
of the blood and surname” would inherit the estate of the deceased.  
The question in Tanistry was whether the adoption of English 
common law had abolished this custom or whether the court would 
take judicial notice of Tanistry as lex loci or local common law.  
The case of Tanistry and the role of the common law in the 
conquest of Ireland is explored at length by Hans Pawlisch.17  As a 
type of action, it is the more familiar application of the doctrine of 
judicial notice.  In Tanistry, the plaintiffs asked the court to take 
judicial notice, and decide a case under, foreign, Brehon law.  The fact 
that in Tanistry the same doctrine was applied to take judicial notice 
of the law governing the system of inheritance rights of a conquered 
country as was applied to judicially recognise the familiar, domestic 
customary rights of inhabitants sometimes generates confusion.18 In 
England, the law of custom, using the same name, with the same 
doctrinal test, and the same theory of judicial notice was applied to 
judicially recognise vastly different subject matters.   
In Scots law, the two factual situations are dealt with by very 
distinct doctrines.  Rights in the nature of inhabitant customs attached 
to burghs are litigated as servitudes or community rights, whilst the 
doctrine of ‘custom’, the elements of which are the same as in English 
law, is reserved for the judicial recognition of customs that are 
‘foreign’ to Scots law that are found within the jurisdiction, especially 
                                                 
16 (1608) Davis 28, 80 ER 516. 
17 Hans S. Pawlisch, Sir John Davies and the conquest of Ireland: a study in legal 
imperialism (CUP 1985). 
 
18 Christopher Jessel, The Law of the Manor (Wildy, Simmonds and Hill Publishing 





Udal law.  The doctrine denominated ‘custom’ in Scots law is very 
close to the doctrine of custom found in Tanistry.  Dr. David Sellar 
recognises this in his chapter on custom in the Stair Memorial 
Encyclopedia.   In his estimation,  
“[t]here is a clear parallel to be drawn between the 
leading case of Bruce v Smith [wherein the Court of Session 
refused to recognise the pursuer’s customary right under the 
local, applicable, Udal law of Shetland to 1/3 of the proceeds 
of a whale drive] and the leading Tanistry Case in England.  In 
both instances, the ‘custom' in dispute derived from a legal 
order distinct from the common law: Udal law as distinct from 
Scots common law in the one, and Irish ‘Brehon law’ as 
distinct from English common law in the other.”19 
 
As we shall see, below, the doctrine that is closest by analogy 
to the doctrine in Scots law through which rights of a community are 
recognised by passage of time or prescription is that of servitudes.  Dr 
Sellar states that the doctrine of ‘Custom’ in Scots law,  
 “except as synonymous with use rights over a period 
of time, plays no part in the recognition of particular servitude 
rights.”20 
 
Whilst the doctrine of ‘custom’ in Scots law has nothing to do 
with servitudes that arise by prescription, as discussed below, 
servitudes held by incorporated communities on behalf of their 
inhabitants are analogous to rights that inured to English communities 
under the English doctrine of custom – custom in the Gateward’s 
Case sense of the term:  
                                                 
19 David Sellar, ‘Custom as a Source of Law’ 22 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia 
(Edinburgh: The Law Society of Scotland/Butterworths, 1987) paras 356-358, para 
388. 
 




“usage which obtains the force of law, and is in truth the 
binding law, within a particular district or at a particular place, 
of the persons or things which it concerns.”21  
The Scots Law of Servitudes/Community Rights 
The communities that created legal rights through praxis or long use 
in Scotland that are studied in the submitted works are incorporated 
burghs.  By the eighteenth century, Scotland did not have the same, 
pluralist legal tradition as England. In part, this is because common 
land – other than that belonging to the Royal Burghs – had been 
enclosed in 1695.22  Indeed, under Scots law, the inhabitants of an 
unincorporated locality in Scotland could not establish rights quà a 
community on behalf of its inhabitants;23 only incorporated burghs 
could hold use rights on behalf of their inhabitants.   
When the Scots courts recognised community customary use 
rights at law, they did not recognise local common law; rather, praxis 
gave rise to a legal right recognised at common law, which was held 
by the burgh and the fluctuating community of burgh inhabitants. 
Such rights could be exercised over either burgh land or, in some 
circumstances, on land without the burgh.  The doctrine pursuant to 
which such rights were recognised was the doctrine of servitudes, 
although from early in the nineteenth century, it was clear that not all 
the members of the Court of Session agreed that this was doctrinally 
correct.  
The reasons for the diversity in judicial view of the appropriate 
doctrine to be applied to the community rights of burgh inhabitants 
varied and to some extent reflected familiarity of both the bench and 
bar with the English law of custom.  Judicial unease was generated by 
                                                 
21 Thomas H. Carson, Prescription and Custom: six lectures (Sweet and Maxwell, 
Limited 1907) (quoting Tindal, C.J. Tyson v Smith, 9 Ad. & Ell. 421), 112.  
 
22 Division of Commonties Act 1695 (c.69) (act that enabled holders of 
common land to sue for division and take their portion as individual landholders). 
23 They could only claim such rights either as individual feuars of land or as a member 




the fact that the doctrine of servitudes could not always be easily 
applied to claims of use rights by burgh inhabitants. 
Firstly, the doctrine of servitudes required that a dominant and 
servient tenement exist, and ultimately the courts would find that only 
a royal burgh was infeft of land such that it could constitute a 
dominant tenement.  This meant that similar rights held by burghs of 
barony and regality could not be recognised under the law of 
servitudes.   
Secondly, where the use was one made of burgh land that 
formed part of the common good, upholding the legal right to use was 
not a matter of the private law of servitudes but rather the public law 
of enforcing the magistrates’ obligation to protect the common good 
and deploy the burgh’s resources in the interests of the inhabitants.24   
Ultimately, the rights recognised as servitudes would be reconstructed 
in the mid-nineteenth century as public law community rights.  This is 
discussed further, below.   
The doctrine of community servitudes as litigated in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as it applied to rights acquired by 
long use had three requirements. Firstly, as discussed above, 
servitudes were constituted between tenements.  Secondly, where the 
servitude was created by long use, at least forty years’ certain and 
continuous use must have been proven.25  The final requirement had 
to do with the nature of the right claimed.  The right had to have been 
judicially determined to fall within a category of use that the court 
would recognise could be claimed as a right of servitude.   The 
category of recognised servitudes was not closed.   
The submitted works demonstrate that the Scots courts were 
free to accept or reject alleged community servitudes on the ground 
that the use was, or was not, one recognised as a servitude at law. In 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, new uses were added to the 
                                                 
24 Urban Commons: from customary use to community right on Scotland’s bleaching 
greens (hereinafter ‘Urban Commons’) 328-330. 
 




list of those that the courts would recognise under the doctrine of 
servitudes.  Notably, as discussed at length in the submitted works, 
bleaching and golfing were recognised as ‘new’ servitudes by the 
Court of Session.  
Doctrinal Coherence in the Submitted Publications 
The submitted works, as a body of work, investigated the judicial 
reception of rights inuring to communities and the fluctuating 
inhabitants that lived there that arose through long use.  In the English 
and Scots cases considered in the submitted works, the common 
factual denominators were that members of communities were seeking 
to have the central courts recognise that their use of land for particular 
purposes over a long period of time had created a legal right in the 
fluctuating inhabitants of the community to use the land for those 
purposes.  In England, long use of land for particular purposes by 
inhabitants of a distinct, unincorporated locale can be claimed under 
the doctrine of ‘custom’.  In Scotland, the analogous doctrine for 
incorporated communities is that of 'community servitudes' or what 
came to be known as ‘community rights’ (hereinafter ‘community 
servitudes/rights’).  
In English law, common law doctrines through which the royal 
courts recognised a legal right of the members of a community to use 
land owned by another include custom and prescription.  Inhabitant 
custom is closely related to the doctrine of prescription.26  
Prescription, however, is personal – it is a doctrine under which a 
named person or corporate body claims a right to use land based upon 
a grant (whether real or as a matter of legal fiction) to an actual or 
juridical person. Custom, on the other hand, is local – it operates over 
a defined district and inures to, and can be claimed by, an undefined 
and fluctuating class of individuals that live in that locality.   
                                                 
26 Rowles v Mason (1612) 2 Brownl 192,198, per Coke, CJ, ‘Prescription and 
custom are brothers and ought to have the same age, and reason ought to be the 
father and congruence the mother, and use the nurse, and time out of memory to 





Despite the fact that the Scots burghs are corporations, the 
community servitudes/rights examined in the submitted works are 
more akin to rights arising by custom than prescription because they 
are, in most cases, alleged to have been created solely through long 
use.  The submitted works are concerned with the recognition by the 
central courts of community use as the source of law or legal rights.  It 
is the use that created the rule laid before the court for recognition. 
Of course depending on the focus of the enquiry – the rights 
holder, the nature of the right or how the right is alleged to have been 
created – in some cases the custom/prescription distinction broke 
down. This is because the ‘grant’ in prescription cases not only could 
be, but was sometimes openly acknowledged to be, a fiction.  The 
same community use would give rise to the same right, absent any 
genuine grant, but depending on the identity of the claimant – village 
or incorporated town – the claim would be made either by custom or 
prescription.  
Servitudes and rights by prescription, however, had one, 
fundamental aspect in common; they could, in theory, be discharged 
by the rights holder.   Where there has been a grant (prescription) or 
there are dominant and servient tenements, there are legal persons 
who can negotiate and discharge the claimed right.  As John Baker has 
pointed out, in the case of custom, the rights are held by a fluctuating 
class of persons, and there is no juridical person who can discharge 
it.27  In Scotland, the ability to discharge a right held by a royal burgh 
on behalf of its inhabitants, however, was circumscribed by the by the 
obligations of the magistrates to protect the ‘common good’.  This was 
why in Dempster the golf links had to be protected by the magistrates 
when the land was sold, and in Magistrates of Kilmarnock v Wilson 
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(1776) (Kilmarnock), the burgh's land had to be kept available for 
bleaching linen.28 
From a doctrinal point of view, the interest in land in English 
law that is closest to that of the Scots servitude is an easement.  
Despite the acknowledged common law roots of easements and 
servitudes and shared legal elements, they are not co-extensive.29  
Moreover, the nature of the rights claimed as ‘community servitudes’ 
in the examined Scots law cases were more akin to rights that in 
England were claimed by prescription or its brother custom than they 
were easements. Such rights include the right to take water from a 
well and the right to recreation on the common good.  
Whilst the doctrines that are drawn together in the submitted 
works are both distinct and different, they are analogous.  The two 
doctrines of custom and community servitudes/rights had three central 
doctrinal features in common.  Firstly, the doctrines were used by the 
courts of the respective jurisdictions to recognise rights that had been 
acquired through community use of land over a long period of time.  
In England, the doctrine of custom required that the use had been in 
existence for ‘time immemorial'; in Scotland, the claimant of the right 
had to demonstrate 40 years' use. Whilst these time periods appear to 
be vastly different, the antiquity of English custom was a legal 
presumption and ultimately was recognised to be a legal fiction.  In 
many cases, the accepted testimony to the existence of a custom by an 
elderly member of the community in both jurisdictions could amount 
to uses of equal longevity.   
Secondly, in both jurisdictions and under both doctrines, a key 
point of legal contention was the identity of the appropriate claimant.  
In English law, Gateward’s Case (1607) held that customs in the 
nature of a profit à prendre could not be claimed by mere inhabitants 
of a village or manor under the doctrine of custom.  Only a copyholder 
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could claim the right to take something from another’s land by 
custom.  Customs in the nature of an easement, however, could be 
claimed by any of the fluctuating inhabitants of an unincorporated 
village, manor or other locality.   In Scots law, as is discussed in more 
detail, below, the case of Home v Young (1846) (Eyemouth)30  centred 
upon the same question as that which was decided in Gateward’s 
Case: could a landless cottager claim a right of use (in this instance a 
right to take water from a well) on the basis of community use?   
Finally, the doctrines of custom and servitude/community 
rights demonstrate that whilst community use gave rise to the right 
that came to be adjudicated before the courts of the respective 
jurisdictions,  neither in the case of custom nor in the case of 
community servitudes/rights did the law/legal rights where found truly 
represent law ‘from below’.  In both English and Scots law, the court 
had the final say over the nature of the uses that would be approved as 
having created a legal right that could be claimed by local inhabitants.   
Despite similarities in the doctrines and the pleading of the 
English law of custom as persuasive authority, there were fundamental 
differences between the law through which customary rights of 
communities to land were recognised by the courts of the two 
jurisdictions. 
In Scotland, the question of who could claim community use 
rights as legal rights and under what doctrine was subject to both a 
great deal of litigation and some doctrinal confusion in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.  Indeed, in cases where the community was 
the pursuer, the identity of the pursuer, and therefore the nature of the 
right claimed, lay at the heart of the iterative nature of the pleadings 
discussed further below. Cases would begin with one group of 
pursuers and end up with another.  A key reason why Dempster was 
remitted by the House of Lords was that, in Lord Eldon's view, the 
right was (belatedly) claimed by the incorporated town of St Andrews, 
                                                 




but it had not been argued as such in the case below.  In later 
litigation, a variety of categories of pursuers, capable of claiming the 
rights under different doctrines, would be gathered before the case 
would begin. Pursuers would fall away as the theory of the case 
emerged through a series of interlocutory hearings.   
In England, from the early seventeenth century there was a 
definite doctrine with established legal elements that applied so that 
courts could recognise community use rights of unincorporated 
communities over land that arose by long, or prescriptive use as 
having created local common law. In Scotland, landless inhabitants of 
burghs of barony could not claim rights of servitude until the 
reconstruction of the doctrine as ‘community rights’ in the case of 
Eyemouth, and even after Eyemouth inhabitants of unincorporated 
villages could not claim community rights arising by long use at all quà 
an inhabitant of a community.  They could only claim such rights either 
as individual feuars of land or as a member of the public.  
In England, this was the point of the doctrine of custom. It 
enabled claims to be made by those who could not prescribe for rights in 
their own name or in the name of any certain person, in particular, a 
fluctuating body. This was because incorporeal rights affecting the 
ownership of land could be enjoyed, under a custom, by persons having 
no estate or interest in the land itself.  
The thesis of this synthesis is that the development of the 
doctrine in the area of community rights is an iterative process.  The 
emergence of the rule that burghs of barony could not, quà a 
corporation, hold use rights on behalf and for the benefit of their 
inhabitants is an example of this iterative process.  Indeed, the law of 
servitudes as it applied to use rights of incorporated communities was 
mired in doctrinal confusion.  
This confusion was in part fomented by decisions of the House 
of Lords in community servitude/rights cases.  In the case of 
Dempster, at the House of Lords, Lord Eldon appeared to decide the 




servitudes.  It was not unusual for the English law lords to take an 
English law rather than Scots law view of a case before them.  In fact, 
Henry Brougham, who had argued the case for the golfing society, 
would many years after aver to the fact that their Lordships, and 
specifically Lord Eldon, would sometimes do this.31    
In the case of Jeffrey v Roxburgh,32 the House of Lords on 
appeal overturned the decision of the Court of Session that had found 
in favour of the burgesses and inhabitants’ right to bleach linen on the 
small island of Ana in the river Tweed.  The Court of Session had 
found in favour of the townspeople because the duke had admitted 
that he had allowed them to bleach their linen there for ‘time 
immemorial’.  The House of Lords gave no reasons for its decision, 
and three different explanations of the grounds for overturning the 
decision were provided by legal commentators.33  The meaning of the 
case was not resolved for nearly a century.  
The variety of views on the bench regarding the appropriate 
doctrine to apply to community rights, combined with the doctrinal 
confusion generated not least by the House of Lords, meant that the 
legal arguments made in community rights litigation were open-
textured.  In this context, English custom cases were referred to as 
persuasive authority both by advocates in their memorials and by 
members of the Court of Session when deciding Scots community 
servitude/rights cases. At the House of Lords, the Court of Session 
and in the legal arguments of advocates, the custom doctrine explored 
in Persistence was viewed by contemporaries as directly relevant to 
the Scots law cases explored in the three remaining submitted works.  
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the Court of Session 
had rejected the English model of customary rights.  Instead, the First 
Division of the court in the case of Eyemouth re-characterised the 
rights claimed as community rights, which the court then upheld as a 
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matter of public law. As the submitted work, Test Cases recounts, in 
the case of Eyemouth neither the burgh nor the woman claiming the 
right, owned land that could constitute a dominant tenement.  In a 
sense, Eyemouth was Scotland’s Gateward’s Case.  The focus of the 
Eyemouth litigation was that Alice Young, like Robert Smith in 
Gateward’s Case, did not own land and therefore could not claim her 
right as a servitude. In Eyemouth, a poor woman was selected and 
sued by the judicial factor of the burgh of barony so as to vindicate the 
baron’s exclusive use of the well.  Unlike Gateward’s Case, however, 
which removed rights from the poor and landless, in Eyemouth, the 
First Division re-characterised the rights of Young and the other 
inhabitants of the burgh as community rights in public law rather than 
see them disappropriated of their customary right to use a well.  
The story of community customary rights in Scotland is one of  
both community practice and community need in search of a legal 
doctrine.  The difficulties of recognising community rights through the 
law of servitudes were well recognised by communities, advocates 
and the judiciary, alike.  These difficulties were exposed and wrestled 
within a series of test cases in the nineteenth century.   Whilst the 
English common law of custom did not provide a ready doctrinal 
solution to the dilemmas posed by the strictures of the law of 
servitudes, the similarity of the dilemmas faced by the communities 
on both sides of the border claiming similar use rights naturally led 
advocates and judges to look to similar cases decided in England. 
Courts in both jurisdictions had struggled with the question of who 
could legally claim use rights over land.  In England, the court in 
Gateward’s Case significantly narrowed the class of inhabitants that 
could claim a profit à prendre by custom.  A century and a half later, 
the First Division of Scotland’s highest court wrestled with the same 





The Literature on Custom and the Candidate’s 
Contribution to It 
 
The following is a brief survey of the literature on custom both at the 
time the submitted works were written and subsequently.  The 
submitted works were written and published either prior to, or 
simultaneously with, the doctrine of custom becoming a renewed 
focus of scholarship in England, Scotland and the United States.   
 In the US, a new scholarship of custom was generated by the 
decisions of US courts to use the English doctrine of custom to 
recognise customary access to land and to hinder development.34  The 
adoption of custom doctrine is highly politicised, as is the scholarship 
responding to it.35  This is because doctrines concerning community 
custom also relate to current legal debates over public trust doctrine in 
the United States, and the extent to which community customs over 
public trust land will serve, like custom doctrine in Oregon and 
Hawaii, to protect local community land use over the interests of 
developers and wealthy private landowners.  
Such scholarship is also, jurisprudentially, a response to the 
late-twentieth century jurisprudence of the American property law 
scholars discussed in Rabbit Massacre, especially the work of Carol 
Rose, Greg Alexander and Ralph Ellickson.36  All three of these 
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scholars, albeit from different perspectives, explore the importance of 
custom and customary rights in the United States, both within the 
formal legal order (Alexander and Rose) and outside of it (Ellickson).  
Rabbit Massacre applied Carol Rose’s doctrine of the ‘comedy of the 
commons’ to the saga of the community’s attempt to protect the St 
Andrews golf link both within and without the courtroom.  It argues 
that the public law tradition of legal activism in the US that emerged 
from civil rights litigation can also serve to protect customary rights of 
access to land by local communities.  
In Scotland, too, common good land has been both 
rediscovered and politicised, not least by land activist Andy 
Wightman.37   Wightman was concerned with the mismanagement of 
common good land by local authorities.  He argues that councils need 
to be both more transparent and more accountable to the people living 
within their local areas for their handling of the common good.  His 
work is well grounded in both statute and common law. This body of 
law has been elucidated by the doctrinal work of Andrew Ferguson, in 
Common Good Law.38  The nineteenth-century law of community 
servitudes/rights as explored in the candidate’s work is an important 
foundation for both the modern law and the contemporary politics 
concerning the legal obligations of local authorities and the 
management of common good land.  
Another jurisprudential line of scholarship that has developed 
since the publication of the submitted works focuses on custom as a 
source of law generally.  David Bederman’s Custom as a Source of 
Law is an example of such scholarship.  Bederman briefly explores the 
concept of ‘custom’ as a source of law from a variety of disciplinary 
perspectives before examining it as a source of law in the context of 
different areas of domestic and international law.  The work brings 
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together disparate rules from disparate bodies of law under the single 
rubric of ‘custom’ in order to examine custom as a source of law.  
Bederman’s work differs from the approach of the submitted 
works and that of other, contemporary legal historians because it 
assumes that ‘custom’ can be treated as a uniform source of law.   
Most scholars of custom in English law recognise that the custom is 
used in multifarious ways in English law and jurisprudence and begin 
their work by carefully defining what they mean by ‘custom’.39   
Amanda Perreau- Saussine and James Bernard’s introduction 
to their collection of essays The Nature of Customary Law: Legal, 
Historical and Philosophical Perspectives,40 highlights the tendency 
of legal historians to focus on the specificity of the past when asked to 
discuss ‘custom’. One example of this in the same volume is Professor 
Michael Lobban’s essay ‘Custom, common law reasoning and the law 
of nations in the nineteenth century’.  His essay is a study of how 
English common law courts in the nineteenth century engaged with 
and sometimes incorporated the law of nations.  His chapter examines 
in detail how courts incorporated or dismissed arguments based upon 
the law of nations into the common law and the effect of that 
incorporation on later doctrinal developments.41  This approach – to 
address the nature of ‘custom’ through the examination of its 
reception by common law courts – is similar to that of the candidate’s 
submitted works and eschews totalising conclusions about the nature 
and role of custom in law more generally. 
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40 Amanda Perreau- Saussine and James Bernard, The character of customary law: 
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The genesis of the submitted works in the 1990s was the work 
of historians, not lawyers.  As detailed below, the submitted works 
began with the chapter by Edward Thompson in Customs in Common.  
The law of customary rights and its impact on communities was the 
subject of essays by both Edward Thompson, in English law, and Eric 
Hobsbawm, in Scots law.42  Whilst these works, and particularly that 
of Thompson, discuss statutes, case law and legal doctrine, they are 
works of social, not legal history.  The primary concern of these 
historians was the impact of custom on the lives of those subject to the 
law and in particular the poorer members of society.   These social 
historians changed the scholarly focus of the subject of the reception 
of custom.   
Professor Rab Houston, in his article for the social history 
journal Past and Present ‘Custom in Context: medieval and Early 
Modern Scotland and England’, brought together legal and historical 
scholarship in order to explore and compare the role of custom in legal 
and social relations in England and Scotland in the early modern 
period.  His work explicitly adopted and built upon the historical, 
socio-legal approach of Thompson and Hobsbawm.43  
Before the works of these social historians, studies of custom 
were mainly the exclusive purview of legal scholars in works of 
jurisprudence and historical jurisprudence.  The focus of these works 
was custom as a source of law in the legal systems of England and 
Scotland.  In this vein of scholarship in England, the medieval 
doctrine of custom has had recent, historical and jurisprudential 
treatment by Neil Duxbury44 and Sir John Baker.45   
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The most important work of jurisprudence for scholars of 
custom, especially in the modern period, is Allen’s Law in the 
Making.46  As is evidenced in the footnotes in Persistence, his is the 
most detailed study of custom as a source of English law.  Theodore 
Plucknett’s A Concise History of the Common Law was also an 
important source because of its historical perspective on the 
development of the doctrine of custom, particularly in the early 
modern period.47  As discussed, below, the doctrinal elements of 
applied by the central courts to recognise local custom were 
established in the early seventeenth century in the cases Gateward’s 
Case and Tanistry.   Thompson’s essay discusses Gateward’s Case 
and analyses the application of this precedent to the assertion of 
customary rights by communities, and especially landless cottagers, in 
the eighteenth century.  Plucknett provides an important legal 
historical perspective on the early modern delineation of the elements 
of custom that accords with and can be read alongside, the work of 
Thompson.48  Frederick Pollock’s A First Book of Jurisprudence49 
also provided an historically and jurisprudentially informed survey of 
custom doctrine. 
 The submitted works both reflected the state of the literature 
and scholarly interests at the time they were published and contributed 
to that literature.  The works drew upon works of jurisprudence, social 
history and contemporary theories of land law to provide a foundation 
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and context for the candidate’s own doctrinal and historical work.   As 
discussed below in the section on methodology, the submitted works 
are firmly rooted in the traditions and methods of legal history.  To 
this extent, they both depart from and broaden the existing literature.   
The next two sub-sections of this synthesis discuss the submitted 
works and their contribution to the literature in more detail.  
Custom in English Law in the Nineteenth Century 
The starting point for the submitted works is the seminal chapter by 
Edward Thompson in his collection of essays Customs in Common 
entitled  “Custom, Law and Common Right”,50 which was published 
whilst the candidate was studying for her J.D. at Cornell Law School 
in 1991.  For legal historians, Thompson is the most renowned of the 
first generation of English Marxist social historians because of his 
engagement with law, most notably in the monograph Whigs and 
Hunters.51  As one of the triumvirate of English Marxist historians – 
the others being Christopher Hill and Eric Hobsbawm – Thompson 
influenced a generation of historians and historiography in the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s. 
Thompson begins his chapter, 
 “At the interface between law and agrarian practice we find 
custom. Custom itself is the interface, since it may be 
considered both as praxis and as law”.52  
 
This opening line is founded upon the legal theory of custom in 
English law – that custom is lex loci,  judicial notice of which is taken 
by the common law courts so long as it is proved to exist in fact and is 
determined to be ‘good custom’ at law.  Because the origins of 
customary rules lay in the praxis of communities, Thompson viewed 
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custom as ‘law from below’, i.e., law, the source of which, was the 
people themselves.  
A key legal element of the recognition of custom at common 
law is that the custom must be deemed by the court to be ‘reasonable’.  
Thompson tells us:  
“‘Reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ may be ‘legal terms of art’ 
but on a very brief view of case law they were gates through 
which a large flock of other considerations might come baaing 
and grunting onto the fields of the common law.”53 
 
Thompson’s use of the term ‘legal terms of art’ in opposition 
to ‘other considerations’ signals that Customs in Common continues 
his polemic against those lawyers and scholars that posit that the 
meaning of a legal terms of art are both fixed and determined solely 
with reference to ‘law’, defined as an acontextual and self-referential 
body of knowledge. Professor Simpson reminds us in his introduction 
to Leading Cases that Thompson called ‘the greatest of all legal 
fictions’ the lawyer’s belief that ‘the law itself evolves, from case to 
case, by its own impartial logic, true only to its own integrity, 
unswayed by expedient considerations’.54  Thompson argued that no 
legal terms of art in the black letter lawyer’s sense exist. The 
submitted works share this perspective that the black letter model of 
law does not reflect the reality of law, and that legal history, in 
particular, demonstrates this.   
Thompson said that the interface of law and agrarian praxis is 
custom.  The submitted works explore this interface.  The thesis of 
these works is that the interface is not the law of ‘custom’, but rather 
custom litigation.  This is because whilst customary rights or uses are 
created ‘in fact’ by the praxis of a community, ultimately such rights, 
once contested, are determined to be law or a legal right by courts. 
The submitted works explore this interface in order to investigate how 
the reception of customary rights and uses are mediated by legal 
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doctrine and the judiciary, legal process and legal procedure, the 
community of legal professionals and extra-legal events.  The central 
argument that underlies both the submitted works and the 
methodology employed to produce them is that the reception of 
customary rights is a process not an event.   
The first submitted work is Persistence. 55  This work is in part 
a response to Thompson’s chapter in Customs in Common, as well as 
a study that builds upon that done by Thompson on custom in the 
eighteenth century.  In the style of US law reviews, before launching 
into the central subject of the article, the reception of customary rights 
in English law in the nineteenth century, the article introduces the 
doctrine of custom.  This introduction is based upon treatises, such as 
St Germain’s Doctor and Student, Coke on Littleton and Blackstone’s 
Commentaries.  Other secondary sources include twentieth-century 
jurisprudential texts such as Allen’s Law in the Making and 
Plucknett’s A Concise History of the Common Law.   Books written 
for the profession were also used, for example Thomas Carson’s 
Prescription and Custom and Adkin’s Copyhold and Other Land 
Tenures of England, both of which were published in the early 
twentieth century.  
These works, together with examples from case law, 
contributed to the article’s description of the doctrine of custom, its 
elements, how it operated and its historical development.  This 
introduction to the law of custom would become a fixture in the 
American legal literature because it was published the year of the  
Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Stevens v Cannon Beach.56  In 
Cannon Beach, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim that the public 
easement over Oregon’s dry sand beaches established by custom (in 
the English doctrinal sense) and found in the case State ex rel. 
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Thornton v Hay57 constituted a ‘taking of property’. The court held 
that the customary right of the public to the dry sand beach on the 
coastline of Oregon constituted a ‘background principle’ of state law.  
In short, the plaintiffs did not suffer a ‘taking’ of property because the 
customary right of the public existed at the time the plaintiffs took 
ownership of the property.  
Persistence examines the jurisprudence of custom in 
nineteenth-century English courts.  It argues that the courts took 
judicial notice of custom as local common law in so far as the custom 
claimed was law-like in form in nineteenth-century terms.  
The primary focus of the work was the reception of custom by 
judicial elites. Custom litigation, however, is the interface between the 
asserted land rights of landowners and communities, and the law or 
legal process, and so cannot by definition ignore the social and 
historical context of the rights being asserted, adjudicated and 
decided.  The judiciary was being asked to recognise contemporary 
community rights over land as ‘reasonable’. The study of custom 
cases carried out in Persistence investigated the changing nature of 
judicial responses to the assertion of land use rights by landowners 
and communities, which themselves changed over time.  
The study of the English doctrine of custom is particularly 
illuminating in this regard because the legal elements of custom 
doctrine had remained stable since the early seventeenth century when 
they were laid down in the twin cases of Gateward’s Case58 and 
Tanistry.59  Persistence investigated the judicial reception of 
customary rights in the nineteenth century under the stable elements of 
the doctrine of custom in order to assess whether, and in what ways, 
judicial attitudes to ‘custom’ as a source of law in the context of the 
regulation of local land use changed over time.  
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Persistence concludes that there are significant differences 
between the reception of the custom by the courts in the eighteenth 
century, at the time of the second enclosure movement, and in the 
nineteenth century.  The article argues that nineteenth-century courts, 
applying the same doctrinal elements as those used in the eighteenth-
century judgments discussed by Thompson, both upheld community 
assertions of customary rights more often and did so on different 
judicial policy grounds. 
The article demonstrates how the nineteenth-century judiciary, 
in a turn-about from the attitude of eighteenth-century courts, appears 
to strive to uphold customs that they find are in the interest of the 
community alleging them.60  They used a variety of devices to do so, 
including taking advantage of procedural rules, employing legal 
fictions and applying the terms of the Prescription Act 1832 in a 
manner favourable to those claiming custom.61   
Another contribution of Persistence is to demonstrate how an 
increasingly positivist judiciary focused upon the good origins of 
custom rather than the validity of custom as presently exercised. 
Persistence shows that in the nineteenth century, courts looked to the 
supposed reasonable origins of custom in order to uphold it. In other 
words, custom was not treated as law resulting from mere praxis of 
the community.  Customs’ origins, rather like other forms of modern 
law, were said to originate either like public law in the lord’s court62 
or as in private law in a contract between a lord and his copyholders.63  
In either case, the reasonableness of the customs alleged would 
depend upon them being customs to which the court believed the 
homage or copyholders would have consented.64  Reasonableness 
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meant nothing more than that the custom was genuinely a result of 
agreement rather than having arisen by either “accident or 
indulgence”.  Even the lawful origins of inhabitant custom were 
required to be shown.   Where customs inured to the benefit of the 
community, their legal origins were viewed by the judiciary to be 
more probable.65 In this way, customs that favoured the interests of a 
lord over the copyholders, community or public at large – customs the 
nature of which had been upheld in the eighteenth century – were held 
by courts to be unreasonable.66  
This focus on the origins of custom, however, when applied 
through the legal element of certainty, could operate to disallow 
alleged community customs when the custom did not comport with 
recognised jurisdictional boundaries.  Where customs were not 
‘properly laid’ in a single manor or could not have originated in the 
grant of a single lord, they were disallowed.67   
Persistence goes on to argue that positivism was not the only 
nineteenth-century intellectual concept that is evident through a close 
reading of the case law.  The article posits that the nineteenth-century 
judiciary upheld custom on the grounds of its utility – that is, good 
custom served the interests of the many over the few.  This is why, it 
is argued, that unlike the case law of the eighteenth century, 
nineteenth-century cases evidence a refusal to accept as reasonable 
customs alleged by individual lords of the manor that operate to the 
detriment of the wider community.  Even where the judge believed 
that the local custom would deprive the owner of the beneficial use 
and enjoyment of his land, ‘the benefit and advantage accruing to’ the 
inhabitants were held to ‘outweigh the injury and disadvantage arising 
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therefrom to the owner of the land’.68  Indeed by the early twentieth 
century, the fact that a custom benefitted the community was held to 
be proof of its ‘lawful commencement’.69  The article concludes that  
“the paradox of the nineteenth century was that a distinctly 
modern, positivist judiciary upheld custom on the grounds of 
its utility”.70  
 
The contribution of Persistence to the literature of custom is to 
show how the judicial reception of claims of custom by English courts 
in the nineteenth century differed markedly from that demonstrated in 
similar cases litigated in the eighteenth century.  Persistence 
demonstrated that nineteenth-century courts viewed ‘custom’ as a 
form of law that in order to be deemed reasonable should benefit the 
community – be they inhabitants or copyholders.  Alleged customs 
that benefitted a single fee holder to the detriment of the community 
would not be upheld in law as reasonable.  Custom would only be 
recognised as lex loci to the extent it could be shown to benefit the 
community.  The article argues this reflected a judicial concern for the 
utility of custom.   
The contribution of Persistence to the literature is that it 
provides an account drawn from a close reading of reported English 
custom cases in the nineteenth century.  That account summarises the 
approaches taken by the central courts to the reception of lex loci in 
the nineteenth century.  The article then goes on to relate those 
findings to nineteenth-century jurisprudence more generally and in 
particular, the rise of utilitarianism and legal positivism in legal and 
jurisprudential thought.  
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The Reception of Community Rights Arising by 
Prescription in Scots Law 
 
Dempster v Cleghorn (1813) reads like an English custom case, 
complete with commons riot to take back the community’s customary 
rights but was from the wrong jurisdiction to be included in 
Persistence. Scotland, particularly before the wholesale digitisation of 
resources, as a mixed jurisdiction had significant research advantages 
for the legal historian compared to England because it is a jurisdiction 
of written pleadings that are helpfully gathered together in collections 
of Session Papers held by the Advocates and Signet Library.  The 
Session Papers, together with a wealth of other primary resources 
available on the case of Dempster, led to the article The Great Rabbit 
Massacre – A “Comedy of the Commons”? Custom, community and 
rights of public access to the links of St Andrews (hereinafter ‘Rabbit 
Massacre’) and the other submitted works on Scots law 
 The primary research for Rabbit Massacre began with the 
pleadings held by the NRS and the Session Papers held by the 
Advocates’ Library.  These led on to research in local archives, where 
more pleadings and lawyers' letters were held.  The British Golf 
Museum in St Andrews provided specialist secondary sources, as well 
as the minute book of the club, which showed that the litigation had 
galvanised the club into more frequent meetings (if not enough 
meetings to always meet filing deadlines). 
This primary research was carried out in the context of the 
social history of commons riots71 and US theoretical literature on 
commons and common land.  Rabbit Massacre argued that the 
litigation to preserve the golf links of St Andrews provided a unique 
example of Carol Rose’s ‘Comedy of the Commons’ – a town green 
on which not merely the community but the public at large could play.  
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The article contributed to the literature by introducing 
American property law theory to a British audience and by applying 
American legal theory to a case study from Scots law – one where 
there was a significant amount of primary historical material available.  
The application of the theory was made possible by a thorough study 
of the wealth of available primary and secondary materials in the 
mode of Professor Brian Simpson’s legal archaeology.  The exercise 
in legal archaeology came first, and the application of Carol Rose’s 
legal theory later when the case appeared to be an apposite case study.  
The conclusion of the article highlights the role that the local 
community played in mediating the preservation of the common land 
and argues that the litigation itself was arguably comedic.  The 
litigation galvanised the golf club to protect the links and to raise 
money from the international golfing community in order to do so.   
The article concludes with a discussion of the highly contested 
US state decision in State ex rel. Thornton v Hay, in which a 
customary right was declared over dry-sand beach the length of the 
state coastline so as to prevent the development of such land by 
private landowners.72  The article argues that such declarations stretch 
the English doctrine of custom to its breaking point and are ultimately 
unnecessary so long as there are affordable procedures to allow 
communities to testify to their local use rights.  Indeed, the conclusion 
goes further – arguing that the protection of community and public 
resources requires some form of guardianship in the absence of, or 
indeed from the predations of, local government and that litigation 
over local use rights can create the organisations that will perform that 
role. 
The contribution of Rabbit Massacre was the application of 
American legal theory to a Scots law example – one which was 
arguably more appropriate than Rose’s favourite town green example 
from English law, Hall v Nottingham.73  The article also contributed 
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some thoughts on the ongoing controversy regarding the use of 
custom in American state law.  Finally, its argument that commons 
litigation itself can be ‘comedic’ contributes a public law perspective 
regarding litigation as a community building exercise that can lead to 
the long-term protection of resources to the jurisprudence of common 
land.  
Researching and writing Great Rabbit Massacre highlighted 
the doctrinal work that needed to be conducted on the subject of what 
Sir John Rankine, Professor of Scots Law at the University of 
Edinburgh 1888-1922, termed “customary use of municipal lands”.74  
As he points out, such rights are discussed in the context of servitudes 
but in his view  
“In the cases which belong to this category, the Court is 
engaged not in judging a public right in private property, but in 
controlling the administration of public officials.” 
 
It is precisely this fact – that the vindication of customary rights over 
municipal lands involved questions of both public and private law – 
that led to a gap in the literature.75  Another reason for this gap is that 
such rights, before being recognised as public law rights, were 
litigated as servitudes, a category into which the rights did not 
comfortably fit.   From the early nineteenth century in cases such as 
Dempster v. Cleghorn and Burntisland76 judges were querying 
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75 George L Gretton reviewing Andy Wightman The Poor had no Lawyers: Who 
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whether the rights being claimed by burgh inhabitants belonged to the 
category of servitudes at all.77  The decision of Dempster, itself, never 
found a servitude to kill rabbits on the golf course – the court found a 
custom to do so.78   
The cases that are discussed in and Customary Rights in Scots 
Law: Access to Land in the Nineteenth Century (hereinafter ‘Test 
Cases’) appear most often in textbooks and treatises as some form of 
miscellaneous right or servitude.79  Neither their history nor their 
doctrine had been explored in detail in the literature.  The most 
important contribution to the literature of these submitted works is the 
detailed examination of the doctrine of community rights in the 
context of the community uses they were protecting and the judges 
who were adjudicating them.      
Urban Commons examines cases concerning access to land to 
bleach linen.   The article traces the development of a community 
right to bleach in Scotland from the early eighteenth century in 
Falkland v Carmichael80, where a plurality of the judges held that 
bleaching could not be claimed as a servitude, to the decision in 
Eyemouth,81 which removed the question of community rights to 
bleach from the category of servitudes altogether and upheld the 
community’s right to bleach right as a matter of community right, a 
right in public law. 
The contribution of Urban Commons is to carefully trace the 
complex doctrinal development of the right of local inhabitants to 
bleach linen, whether as a servitude or as a community right. It is not a 
straightforward tale.  The article explored the complexities of 
doctrinal development by examining varying judicial explanations of 
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the meaning of cases in the context of the developing doctrine, as well 
as those of reporters, and contemporary legal commentators such 
Mark Napier and Baron Hume.82   
Using the methodological approach of what would become 
known as legal archaeology that the candidate had first used in Rabbit 
Massacre (discussed below),  the legal strategy of the case of Home 
was uncovered, as was the legal advice provided to the judicial factor 
of the burgh not to bring an action in the context of uncertain facts and 
law.83 This context highlighted the nature of Home as a test case, a 
fact that was explored in greater detail in Test Cases.   The final 
contribution of Urban Commons were the reflections contained in its 
conclusion on the work of Edward Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm.84 
It argued that custom cases reveal that conducting a simple class 
analysis in order to understand the judicial decisions fails to 
illuminate.  
 The final submitted work is Test Cases.  This article continues 
the story of the doctrinal development of community rights in Scots 
law and focuses on the test case nature of Home and the significance 
of that decision for the test case of Dyce v Hay. 
Test Cases began with an exploration of Scotland’s burghs and 
the doctrines through which the uses of land by burgh inhabitants 
could be vindicated through legal action.  The article reviews the 
complex doctrinal developments in the law regarding the recognition 
of burgh community use rights and argues that the uncertain state of 
the law made the area one ripe for test cases.  One of the most 
important contributions of this article was its reconstruction of the 
process by which the doctrine which applied to community use rights 
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and developed and the historical context in which that development 
occurred. 
The article highlights the highly politicised nature of the rights 
at issue in community servitude/community rights cases and 
demonstrates how, in the context of an open-textured doctrine, judges 
were free to come to decisions that reflected their personal judicial 
values.  The article points to the importance of the Edinburgh Whig 
lawyers, who as politicians, lawyers and ultimately judges argued for 
broader rights of access to the countryside.  It argues that the decision 
in Dyce v Hay represented a judicial ‘conservative backlash’ against 
the expansion of the recognition of community and public rights of 
access land.   
Beyond the elucidation of the doctrinal development of 
community servitudes/community rights, the most significant 
contribution of Test Cases is to identify the test-case nature of the 
nineteenth-century litigation and the political context in which those 
test cases were decided.  Ultimately, understanding the context in 
cases are brought and judicial decisions taken in a complex area of 
doctrine can assist the contemporary legal academic in the task of 
attempting to explicate current doctrine, not least by accounting for 
the confusing and sometimes irreconcilable state of that doctrine.85  
The method and methodology of the submitted 
works 
 
The origins of the submitted works lie in the work of the social 
historian E.P. Thompson and other social histories, but they are works 
of legal history.  The focus of the works is the reception of community 
uses by the central courts of  England and Scotland, and the submitted 
works explore how custom was mediated by the legal process. As 
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such, they are less studies of customary rights as ‘law from below’ 
than of custom as mediated by lawyers and judges, ‘above’.86    
Whilst the source of the law or legal right arising from custom 
in many cases will be community praxis, the authority to declare 
custom ‘law’ or a ‘legal right’ lies solely with the court.  Thus the 
study of custom sheds light on the changing nature of the judiciary’s 
response to assertions of community rights to land.  It is the thesis of 
this synthesis that just as the creation of a custom or community right 
is an iterative process of community use, so too is the process by 
which courts recognise that such rights have given rise to legal rights 
held by the community’s inhabitants.  The recognition of custom is 
not an event, but a process.   The submitted works examine that 
process and how it changes over time, using the sources available to 
the candidate at the time of writing, 
Method and methodology in legal history are to a large extent 
determined by the available sources.  Methodologically, all of the 
articles involved a detailed, doctrinal analysis of the published court 
decisions and how those decisions change over time.  The study in 
Persistence is, by reason of the circumstances in which it was written 
(whilst the candidate was at Cornell Law School) almost solely 
limited to published sources,87 taken together with both contemporary 
and more modern secondary legal sources.  
The thesis of Persistence is founded upon the nature of its 
sources – that is, that through a close reading of the published case 
reports, the candidate observed changes over time in the judicial 
reception of custom.  Such a close reading employed the methods of 
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traditional doctrinal analysis to assess the judicial application of the 
elements of custom doctrine over time. 
In English law, the legal elements of the doctrine remained 
static from the early seventeenth century when they were established 
in Gateward’s Case and the companion case of Tanistry.  Thus by 
studying the interpretation and application of these static elements 
over time, both the changing standards of the judiciary charged with 
recognising legally ‘good’ custom, and the judiciary's changing 
attitude towards such claims, could be assessed.  In the article 
Persistence, the candidate went further and attempted to link the 
changing judicial attitude, interpretation and application of doctrine to 
asserted claims of local customary rights to broader intellectual 
developments in 19th-century England.   
For example,  custom’s origins are meant to be beyond the 
memory of man and the reasonableness of custom is meant to be at the 
time the custom is asserted.88  In this way, customs that are no longer 
useful can be disposed of by the courts by failing to recognise them.  
Absent an Act of Parliament, the point at which a custom is litigated is 
the only opportunity to end or legally disallow a custom that, whilst 
beneficial in its inception, has become burdensome or ‘actually 
injurious to the public interests’.89  As discussed above, once a custom 
is recognised by the court, it cannot be discharged because there is no 
juridical person to do so.90  A close doctrinal reading of custom cases 
over time, however, demonstrates that by the nineteenth century, the 
courts look to the origins of customs to recognise them or refuse to do 
so.  The courts even create legal fictions around those origins upon 
which the judges then rely to demonstrate that a custom was or was 
not reasonable and could or could not be recognised by the court.   
The decisions and reasoning in cases such as Arlett v Ellis91 
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and Salisbury v Gladstone92 highlight not only a change in the 
interpretation and application of doctrine between the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries but also a change in attitude of the judiciary to the 
reception of custom.  The cases detail the legal reasoning employed by 
the judges to justify the change in approach.  The identification of the 
doctrinal change using traditional methods of legal analysis enabled 
the candidate both to identify trends in the case law and hypothesise 
why those trends existed.  In Persistence, it is argued that the 
judiciary’s focus on the good origins of custom reflects the growth of 
positivism in nineteenth-century law.93   
This hypothesis was supported by carrying out a similar 
doctrinal exercise tracing the doctrinal element of certainty as applied 
in published decisions.  The certainty of customs became an 
increasingly important factor in the nineteenth century when courts 
recognised or refused to recognise customs. The conclusion of 
Persistence was that whatever the lived experience of custom, 
inhabitant customs that came to be recognised by nineteenth-century 
courts were those customs that were most law-like.94  
The method employed to reach the conclusions in Persistence 
was that which Sir John Baker discusses in his chapter, Reflections on 
‘doing’ legal history.95  It is no accident that the method employed by 
the candidate in central New York in the 1990s is similar to that 
employed by Professor Baker.  Professor David Millon advised the 
candidate for an essay on custom that ultimately led to the published 
research.  He had attended Professor Baker’s lectures at Harvard and 
spent time at Cambridge University, where he attended Professor 
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Milsom’s seminars and had worked informally with Professor 
Baker.96  
In an era before legal history had had its ‘methodological 
moment’, legal historical method was transmitted through formal and 
informal research supervision.97  Professor Baker’s method was no 
doubt employed by many legal historians and continues to be so 
today.  This is why, perhaps, Sir John’s chapter appears at the 
beginning of Making Legal History: Approaches and Methodologies.  
To begin with, his method not only recognises his pre-eminence in the 
field of legal history, but also that his method is the starting point, and 
for many scholars still the end point, of much of the legal history 
produced today.  
The candidate’s method for the production of Persistence and, 
to a significant extent, all of the submitted works, was the method that 
Professor Baker says is closest to his own, which is “to delve into the 
available sources first and see what kinds of question they raise or 
might answer”.98  The article, Persistence, began with the candidate’s 
vague aim of learning something about custom in English law.   
Having quickly perused the cases cited by Thompson, which even as 
first glance evidenced the attitude towards both lords and inhabitants 
that Thompson detailed in Customs in Common, the candidate began 
by reading everything that could be located about custom in English 
law – whatever the period.   Alongside the secondary literature, which 
included textbooks, speeches delivered at the Inns of Court and 
contemporary chapters and journal articles in both law and history, all 
of the cases found in the digest, Halsbury’s Laws of England, were 
read and digested and footnotes were followed to further reported 
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cases.  This process required some sifting – copyhold customs from 
customs in the nature of easements, customs about land use from 
customs about inheritance and trade usages.  From this reading, the 
candidate was able to identify different categories of custom, which 
were not always clearly distinguished in sources such as the digests 
and the emergence of a doctrinal focus to the study of the judicial 
reception of custom in the nineteenth century.   
In the end, Baker tells us:  
“The historian, like the lawyer, has to find something 
above and beyond the sources – a story, a changing 
institution, or an evolving idea. . . We must have stored 
in the backs of our minds numerous questions arising 
from our reading of the secondary literature, from our 
knowledge of what went on in other periods and places, 
and above all from the sources themselves.  As we 
uncover more evidence and try to sift out what is 
useful, we are simultaneously relating it to our older 
questions and formulating new ones, until now and 
again we see enough light to propose some answers.  
We never produce final answers, but we help to take 
the general understanding forward.  It is a collective 
exercise.”99   
 
This was the method proposed by Professor Millon and that was used 
to write Persistence.  The method employed in writing the final article 
was to engage traditional doctrinal analysis, alongside historical and 
contemporary secondary sources, in order to identify a pattern of a 
change in the interpretation and application of the stable doctrinal 
elements of custom over time.  Unlike a traditional black letter 
doctrinal analysis, the study of custom doctrine was carried out in 
light of the historical and jurisprudential context in which it was 
interpreted and applied.  This background knowledge of context was 
formed by secondary legal, jurisprudential and historical texts.100  The 
candidate is a trained historian and applied historical method to the 
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reading of the ‘archival sources’ of the nineteenth-century published 
law reports.   
In light of the observed changes in the development of the 
application of custom doctrine, the candidate proffered an explanation 
for those changes utilising secondary legal and jurisprudential 
literature and her knowledge of nineteenth-century history.  The 
article argued that the case law concerning custom in the nineteenth 
century reflects a judicial concern with legal positivism and 
utilitarianism.  This explanation was largely based upon a close 
reading of the nineteenth-century custom cases, and a parsing of 
judicial language, in light of these nineteenth-century jurisprudential 
and philosophical movements.  
Legal Archaeology and the Methodology employed in the 
submitted works on Scots law 
Professor Baker says that his method, “may owe something to [his] 
passing youthful interest in archaeology”.  This echoes the final 
paragraph of Brian Simpson’s introduction to his book, Leading Cases 
in the Common Law.101  In that introduction, he tells us that Professor 
Peter Fitzpatrick,  
“suggested that I should use the expression ‘legal archaeology’ 
in the title of this book, aiming boldly to invent or at least to 
name, a new category of legal scholarship.  Although I have 
not done so, the suggestion was a tempting one. . . [A] reported 
case does in some ways resemble those traces of past human 
activity – crop marks, post holes, the footings of walls, pipe 
stems, pottery shards, kitchen middens, and so forth, from 
which the archaeologist attempts, by excavation, scientific 
testing, comparison, and analysis to reconstruct and make 
sense of the past.  Cases need to be treated as what they are, 
fragments of antiquity, and we need, like archaeologists, 
gently to free these fragments from the overburden of legal 
dogmatics, and try, by relating them to other evidence, which 
has to be sought outside the law library, to make sense of them 
as events in history and incidents in the evolution of the law.” 
 
                                                 




From those humble beginnings, an aside in conversation by 
Professor Fitzpatrick and a mention in Brian Simpson’s introduction 
to Leading Cases, legal archaeology is now, arguably, a full-blown 
methodology.  That this is so, owes much to the existence of the 
internet and the mass scanning of both primary and secondary sources, 
which allows even law students to produce a deep case study in the 
course of a single semester.102 
   The method used by Simpson was a natural fit for the 
candidate to use to produce the article Rabbit Massacre once the 
extensive primary sources of the Dempster litigation were uncovered.  
Not least because Simpson cites the work Marxist historian Edward 
Thompson, as well as the socialist constitutional lawyer and historian 
J.A.G. Griffith as examples of ‘legal archaeology’.103    Moreover, the 
methods of Professor Baker and Professor Simpson have much in 
common. Their work did not begin with an established methodology 
or with “some general philosophical theory of judicial decision”; 
rather their methods begin with the sources.104  The methods of 
Professors Baker and Simpson work well in concert, where the 
sources are available, and a thick study of custom is desired, or, as in 
the case of studying the development of a complicated doctrine such 
as that of Scots community rights, the candidate argues, below, are 
required. As Professor Twining recognised,   
“Simpson’s main contribution is to add another 
perspective and one specific device to the resources of 
scholars and teachers of law. . . [that] . . . stay quite 
close to common law traditions of legal scholarship, 
legal history and legal education.  This particular set of 
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lenses can usefully broaden their practices from within, 
without threatening or forwarding a revolution.”105 
 
Another reason Rabbit Massacre was written using the method 
of legal archaeology is that the method lends itself to studies of law 
and society through ‘law and’ studies.106  Rabbit Massacre used a case 
concerning the links of St Andrews to introduce a British audience to 
the uses of ‘custom’ in the theoretical debates amongst US property 
legal academics and as a case study of Carol Rose’s theory of the 
‘comedy of the commons’.  Rose argued that some resources 
constituted ‘inherently public property’.  Contrary to the theory of the 
‘tragedy of the commons’ posited by Gareth Hardin, where common 
use ultimately leads to the degradation of resources commonly held, 
Rose argued that for some kinds of resources, more is ‘merrier’.107  
The St Andrews case study was selected because one of Rose’s 
favourite examples of the comedy of the commons is that of maypole 
dancers on an English village town green.108  One of the difficulties 
for both US courts and American theorists when seeking to apply the 
law of custom to US property dilemmas is that the English (and 
indeed Scots law) of custom and customary rights is inherently local.  
Rose’s other examples other than that in Hall v Nottingham of 
‘inherently public property’ involve resources used by the public at 
large.   
A town green is not, in legal terms at least, generally available 
for public use.   The links of St Andrews were unique because the feu 
stated that the golf links was to be ‘reserved entirely, as it had been in 
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times past, for the comfort and amusement of the inhabitants and 
others who shall resort thither for that purpose’ (emphasis added).  In 
other words, in Dempster, there was an example of a town green that 
was open to the public at large and therefore was a potential case 
study of Rose’s comedy of the commons.  
Legal archaeology often refers to the carrying out of an 
individual case study or the exploration a leading case in detail – 
‘legal history on a more modest scale’, which ‘eschew[s] surveying 
the sweep of social change over an era in favor of examining a 
particular case in detail’.109  This was the methodology adopted in 
Rabbit Massacre, the examination in detail of a particular case, but for 
an instrumental purpose – the exploration of Carol Rose’s theory of 
inherently public property.  As mentioned earlier, the study of the 
reception of assertions of community customary uses by the Scots 
courts, methodologically, began as a story – that of Dempster v 
Cleghorn – in search of a doctrine.   
 The method of legal archaeology, however, need not be 
limited to a single case.  In Bleaching Greens and Test Cases, the 
method developed and used for the case study of Rabbit Massacre 
was applied to a line of cases in order to understand the development 
the doctrine of customary rights in its legal, political, social and 
economic contexts.  The method of legal archaeology for the 
exploration of the development of doctrine and the test case nature of 
Eyemouth and Dyce v Hay in those two articles was driven by four 
factors: the availability and breadth of primary and contemporary 
secondary legal and extra-legal sources; the opaque nature of the 
development of the apposite legal doctrine; the iterative nature of the 
doctrinal development both from decision to decision and within the 
litigation record of individual cases; and, finally, the fact that those 
iterations and ultimate doctrinal development took place in the context 
of the litigation of test cases.    
                                                 




As a further explanation of the candidate’s interpretation and 
application of the method of legal archaeology, what follows is an 
explanation of the archival journey of the candidate that produced 
Rabbit Massacre and was also used to produce Bleaching Greens and 
Test Cases.  The variety of primary sources are detailed, together with 
examples of how different types of sources were used in the history 
and analysis of the submitted works.   
The original papers in that case are held by the NRS,110 and the 
Session Papers are held by the Advocates' Library.  The Session 
Papers are bound collections of legal papers presented to the Court of 
Session that were collected by advocates and judges.  The series are 
often named after the families of advocates that collected them. To 
give an idea of the vast size of this collection, the Advocates Library 
holds around 4000 volumes of such Session Papers, in 50 distinct 
series, covering the period 1666-1868.111 The Session papers, together 
with their annotations, are in Scotland the best-written record of the 
process through which community use rights were recognised by the 
courts as having created a legal right. 
One important aspect of seeking to understand the reception of 
local custom by the central courts is recognising that the legal actors 
operate within a process that is circumscribed by both by substantive 
legal rules and conventions and by procedural rules.  The reception of 
custom by the courts is an iterative process – each iteration of which 
can become dominated by these “institutional boundaries”.112  
                                                 
110 Professor Baker objects to this name change. “The establishment at Kew is often 
called the National Archives, but this is a solecism.  The National Archives is the 
administrative organisation which oversees the archives, besides its other 
responsibilities; but the physical repository, the ‘office’ where records are produced, 
is still in law the Public Record Office.” (n 3) 8.  Cf the position in Scotland, where 
the National Archives of Scotland, pursuant to the Scotland Public Records Act 
2011, merged with the General Register Office for Scotland to become the NRS.  
 
 
111 See Angus Stewart ‘The Session Papers in the Advocates Library’ in Hector L 
MacQueen (ed), Miscellany IV (Stair Society 2008). 
 




Following the threads of Dempster, which is part of a complex set of 
litigations, highlights these boundaries.  
The Session Papers enabled the candidate to read the actual 
legal arguments that were presented to court by the litigants in the 
cases explored in the three submitted works on Scots law.  They also 
are sometimes annotated with the views of the Lords of Session.  The 
papers and annotations contain important factual information relevant 
to the case, as well as references to the case law that is argued.   
Some of that case law will not have been reported; so the 
candidate moved from collection to collection of Session Papers in 
order to follow up references and establish the relevant doctrine being 
applied.  Even where cases were reported, in the earlier period of the 
submitted works, in particular, the available decisions sometimes only 
appear in digest form in Morison’s Dictionary of Decisions.  
Morison’s, together with a later appendix, reported cases between 
1801 and 1808. It reproduced both existing published law reports as 
well as publishing previously unreported decisions. The cases are 
organised by topic area and the reports are often very brief.113   
Whilst the presentation of facts by each litigant must be 
evaluated critically, presented as they are in the context of a particular 
legal argument; nonetheless, the facts found in the Session Papers 
were sometimes crucial to understanding the resolution of a case and 
the development of a doctrine  For example, in the case of Tod and 
Stodart, which was referred by some members of the Court of Session 
when finding title to pursue in Dempster, the Session Papers for that 
case revealed that what was at issue was servitude over a public road, 
and therefore a public right of way.114  Absent the complete factual 
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background, a genuine understanding and an accurate historical 
reconstruction of the development of doctrine would be impossible.   
The Session Papers also contain references to secondary 
sources, many of which are available in the Advocates’ Library itself.  
Using the Session Papers, the candidate could not only ascertain that 
advocates had cited the English law of custom in their memorials, but 
also could consult the  book (and in all likelihood the actual copy of 
the book) that the advocates had relied upon for the summary of the 
doctrine, and cases cited could be consulted in the library. 
The Session Papers enabled the candidate to reconstruct the 
iterative process of litigation.  Iterative processes, which have been 
explored in the context of judgments, are also central to the litigation 
of individual cases.115  This is particularly the case when a doctrine is 
either nascent or in the process of development.  The iterations of 
rights arising by customary use are recorded in the Session Papers and 
the resulting decisions of the Court of Session.  Advocates in the 
Session Papers presented legal arguments to be tested, accepted or 
rejected by the judges of the Court of Session and often as not argued 
in the alternative; thus, the Session Papers provide a record of the 
various legal possibilities that were presented to the judiciary for 
decision.  In addition to the published decisions, where they are 
available, marginal notes and references to cases in the margins of the 
printed papers record, in real time, how the arguments made by 
counsel were received and why.  The Session Papers also provided a 
procedural summary of a piece of litigation, which enabled the 
candidate to follow carefully each iteration and seek out unpublished 
decisions held by the NRS.  
Of course, procedure and procedural rules are an important 
boundary to the iterations in custom litigation.  Beyond the central, 
and substantive procedural rule of title and interest discussed above, 
more detailed procedural rules also can determine the course of the 
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iterations of a legal process. In Rabbit Massacre the sources reveal 
how legal process rules, such as those of pleading, and institutional 
practices, like the Lords of Session taking it in turn to sit in the Outer 
House, impacted on the result of the legal action.  In Dempster, a 
decision in favour of the golfers was recalled because it was ultra 
petita – the court had found a customary right to kill rabbits on the 
links of St Andrews that the golfers had not claimed in their petition.   
This meant that everyone involved knew both the court’s view and 
which Lords of Session agreed with it, even though the decision itself 
did not stand.  This led to the legal advice that the townspeople were 
free to ‘go on killing the rabbits’ but not until after July 6, when a 
Lord of Session whose views aligned with the pursers was sitting on 
bills in the Outer House and would adjudicate the expected petition by 
the Dempsters for a suspension and interdict.116 
The legal advice in Dempster highlights another aspect of the 
method of investigating as a matter of legal history the development 
of a doctrine: the significance of who sat on the Court of Session and 
the identity of the Lords of Session in any particular case.  The history 
of community and public litigation over use rights shows us that in the 
nineteenth century, the significance of the identity of the judge was 
not merely a matter of the Lords of Session holding different doctrinal 
views. The triumph of the Whigs and the influence of the Whig judges 
on the test case of Eyemouth serves as an example, as does the case of 
Dyce v Hay, which followed on from it.  Dyce also highlights the 
significance of institutional organisation – in this instance the results 
of the splitting of the Court of Session into two divisions in 1808.117  
An important aspect of legal and judicial personnel in Scotland 
is that the bench is appointed from the bar.  It is significant that some 
judges on the bench will have litigated the issues that come before 
them as advocates.  For these judges, the arguments that come before 
them will have already been well rehearsed.  They may have come to 
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a personal legal view about some issues whilst representing parties as 
advocates (and for those who act in test cases, they most certainly will 
have).   It is because of their experience as advocates that some judges 
both know, and can argue with advocates based upon, prior cases, 
whether reported or not, as well as the contents of the Session Papers.  
This is indicated by reported cases, Session Paper marginalia and the 
extant records of oral argument, such as that collected by Henry 
Cockburn in Harvie v Rodgers.118   
Practising lawyers and socio-legal scholars, alike, remind us 
that legal processes are both driven and bounded by forces beyond 
procedural rules, legal doctrine and the structures of legal institutions, 
such as the courts and bar.  Legal actions must be funded.  The case of 
Dempster was supported by funds collected from across the 
Commonwealth.119  The poor, landless defender in Eyemouth was on 
the poor roll and received free legal advice.120  In Harvie v Rodgers, 
money was raised by Whig inspired events, including an exhibition at 
the Glasgow Fair.  As these examples demonstrate, the nature of the 
funding of an action is linked to the nature of the litigants and the 
litigation, and querying where the money came from to fund an action 
provides further information for the legal historian.  
The lawyers these funds provide are, of course, central to the 
legal process, and their letters and advice are important sources for 
analysing the nature and development of legal doctrine, for example, 
the unsettled nature of community servitudes highlighted in the advice 
provided in advance of the action filed against Alice Young.121   A 
key letter in the Dempster litigation indicates that the riot in that case 
was initiated by the actions of the golfers on the advice of their 
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advocate.122   The same letter pointed to the practice of judge-
shopping and the importance of judicial personnel, highlighted above.  
Such sources can serve to confirm the nature of a case as a test case of 
doctrine or a case of wider political importance.  In Harvie, memoirs 
of the initiators of the action detail its organisation as a test case, with 
the assistance of a local inhabitant and young advocates who were 
sent out to town and villages surrounding Glasgow in search of the 
correct category of pursuer.123   
Sources such as information on litigation funding, letters of 
advice and other information pertaining to the organisation of 
litigation discussed in the submitted works are often contained in the 
burgh records held by local authorities or in estate records.  Such 
records can also provide other key, contextual information on cases.  
The records of St Andrews and Dysart revealed that the litigation over 
the inhabitants use rights over land were merely a part of a larger 
pattern of disputes between the litigants both in court and in the 
community.124  Because the disputes involve land, plans involving the 
town, industry or the feudal superior all can influence the decision to 
file or persist in litigation.  Local authority and estate records can 
often fill in key elements of the story of the litigation of local rights.   
In addition to these primary sources, both contemporary and 
modern secondary sources assisted the candidate in contextualising 
the primary sources and telling the story of the development of the 
recognition of community rights in Scotland.  Such sources could be 
both historical legal secondary sources, such as the work of Hume and 
that of Patrick Napier, written at or near the time of the litigation 
under study, as well as contemporary doctrinal commentary. These 
sources, like contemporary secondary sources today, evidence reliance 
on court papers that are collected in the Session Papers, as well as the 
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author’s personal and professional knowledge of the cases 
discussed.125  Like recorded judgments, some secondary sources can 
evidence a tone that leads the historian to sources outside the legal 
world in which the source has been produced.  Contemporary legal 
secondary sources, like the Session Papers themselves, also reveal the 
iterative nature of the process at arriving at settled legal doctrine and 
the disputes both within and outwith the legal profession about the 
meaning of particular cases.  The varying interpretations of the case of 
Roxburgh is but one example.126  Another would be the meaning of 
Home v Young, as litigated in Dyce v Hay. 
 General histories of access to the countryside and the game of 
golf, i.e., that discuss the subject customs asserted by communities 
were consulted, as were works of local historians who write about the 
places which claimed the community uses. Such sources were 
particularly helpful for the production of Urban Commons, which 
dealt with the history of bleaching and with Rabbit Massacre, where 
general histories of both golf and the St Andrew's links proved 
helpful. 
Ultimately, the method and methodology used in the submitted 
works were driven by the nature and availability of primary resources.  
The significance of both the method/methodology and the resources 
used arguably goes beyond the production of the submitted works.  
They serve to highlight important and distinctive aspects of Scots 
legal culture, which in and of themselves are worthy of further 
investigation.  For instance, the significance of the shared legal world 
of the bar and bench and the implications of appointing experience 
advocates as judges are likely to have implications beyond those 
briefly discussed above with regard to the Whig judges. The Session 
Papers speak to the importance and the significance of written 
pleading to the development of Scotland’s legal culture.  An analysis 
of the implications for the development of the law and legal system of 
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the fact that the Session Papers would have been available for 
circulation at the time they were written and printed and then were 
destined to sit in the Advocates Library and the Signet Library to be 
used as sources by future Advocates and Writers would be another 
fruitful area of research, which would invite interesting comparisons 
with England as a largely oral legal culture.   
 
Conclusion 
This synthesis drew together four works on the reception of the use 
rights of local communities in Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.  It explored, in the first instance, the doctrines applicable to 
the judicial recognition of community use rights over land as lex loci 
in England and as community rights of servitude/community rights in 
Scotland.  Those doctrines were compared and the reasons why 
English custom doctrine was used both as a source of persuasive 
authority in advocates’ memorials, and was misused by the House of 
Lords, was discussed, as was its ultimate rejection in the Scots test 
cases of the mid-nineteenth century.   
 The synthesis goes on to discuss the methods and methodology 
that were used to produce the articles.  That discussion demonstrated 
how, as it is argued is appropriate to works of legal history, the 
methods chosen were driven by the sources available to the candidate 
when the submitted works were written.  For the submitted works on 
Scots law, which involved a great deal of archival work, the nature of 
the archival sources and the methods employed to conduct the analysis 
in the submitted works is discussed.  This section begins with an 
explanation of how the choice of the method of legal archaeology was 
driven not just by the availability of sources sufficient to conduct a 
thick descriptive study, but also the nature of doctrinal development 
and the iterative nature of the litigation of community use rights that 
contributed to that doctrinal development, which took place in the 
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